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Summary
The Prime Minister has called for a “far-reaching pact” between the UK and the EU 
on science and innovation. The issues that such an agreement would need to cover—
funding, people, regulation, collaboration—have been clear since our predecessor 
Committee reported on this in November 2016. Six months ago, the Government 
published its ‘future partnership’ paper on collaboration on science and innovation, 
referring to many of these issues, but the document does not contain a great deal of 
detail. Since then, a range of Ministerial speeches have reaffirmed the importance of 
ensuring science does not suffer as a result of Brexit. However, clarity over future access 
to funding, association with regulatory bodies, and immigration policies is required in 
order to provide certainty.
UK science is entering the Brexit process from a strong starting position. As the 
Government’s Future Partnership paper notes, the UK is home to four of the world’s 
top ten universities, and has more Nobel Laureates than any country outside the 
United States. The UK is second only to Germany in EU project participation, and 
assurances have been provided about participation in Horizon 2020, the EU’s current 
flagship research programme. The Government has made science a key pillar of the 
Industrial Strategy, and has made announcements about EU student places up to 2019. 
The Government’s £4.7bn increase to the UK’s research and development budget by 
2020/21 represents the biggest increase in public R&D investment since 1979, and the 
Government has made a commitment to increase R&D spending further as a proportion 
of GDP to 2.4% by 2027.
Co-operation on science and innovation is widely regarded as a ‘win-win’ for both the 
UK and the EU. Securing an early agreement on science and innovation would set a 
positive tone for other elements of the negotiations, but the Government needs to act 
swiftly. It cannot be taken for granted that the UK will retain its status as a science 
superpower. We welcome the Prime Minister’s commitment to agreeing a science 
and innovation ‘pact’, but we are concerned that if there were to be a protracted delay 
in agreeing this, it would have unfortunate effects. Given the significance of science 
and innovation to the UK economy, reaching an agreement on this should now be as 
important to the Government as addressing the question of security. It must be stripped 
out from the wider trade negotiations for focused attention, rather than become a 
knock-on consequence of other negotiations or be traded against other aspects of a 
post-Brexit deal. We do not accept that ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’ 
in this context. We recommend that the Government make drafting and negotiating a 
science and innovation agreement an urgent priority.
In particular, it is not sufficient for the Government to wait until September for the 
Migration Advisory Committee to report before Ministers address the ‘people’ aspects 
of the UK’s future science and innovation relationship with the EU. The Migration 
Advisory Committee is due to report in September 2018, but this would result in current 
uncertainties continuing for another six months. This issue must be resolved as quickly 
as possible. The Government should ask the Migration Advisory Committee to bring 
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forward its conclusions in relation to the immigration arrangements needed to support 
science and innovation, and build these into a science and innovation agreement with 
the EU by October 2018, or earlier if possible.
Since the Referendum, the Government has given assurances to EU students entering 
UK universities in 2017 and 2018 that they would not see a change in their circumstances. 
Given that many universities will soon need to start distributing information to potential 
students about 2019 entrance procedures, it would be helpful if the Government could 
clarify the status of 2019 applicants as soon as possible
We are concerned that if such a people-centred science and innovation pact is negotiated 
later it risks being less comprehensive due to other negotiation priorities of the wider 
post-Brexit trade deal. Furthermore, if a pact is not agreed in late 2018, this will increase 
risks to retaining and attracting essential talent that our science and innovation sectors 
need.
The Government has avoided openly committing to negotiating ‘associated country’ 
status for the EU research and innovation successor programme to Horizon 2020. This 
uncertainty risks having a direct and imminent impact since, in some areas, funding 
bids for the successor programme will start to be developed in the coming weeks, and 
researchers and businesses need to know what the UK’s intentions are.
With just one year remaining until Brexit, and a commonly-accepted aim of reaching 
a comprehensive Brexit deal by this autumn, the time for setting out broad aspirations 
has passed. The Government must now work quickly to secure a detailed agreement 
covering all of the issues important to science and innovation. With sufficient political 
will these problems can be overcome, but action must be taken now.
5 Brexit, science and innovation 
1 Introduction
Background
1. Our predecessor committee published its report on Leaving the EU: Implications and 
opportunities for science and research in November 2016.1 The report set out a number of 
priority issues for the science and research communities which the Government would 
need to address during the forthcoming Brexit negotiations:
• Funding—in particular the need either to secure ongoing access to sources such 
as the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme and its successors, or to develop 
appropriate domestic funding mechanisms at a similar level if access is not 
negotiated;
• People—specifically the attractiveness of the UK to EU researchers (as well as 
those further afield) as a place to live, work and study, and the need to provide 
guarantees for those already working here;
• Collaboration, leadership and influence—for UK researchers to be part of 
multinational projects, and to continue to influence the EU’s research agenda 
and strategic direction;
• Regulation—ensuring that those regulations which facilitate research 
collaboration and access to the EU market for life science and other research 
outputs are retained, and those which hinder innovation are revised; and
• Facilities—concerns about the ability of UK researchers to continue to access 
EU research facilities in other countries, and the need to protect the future of 
those that are currently hosted in the UK.2
2. In September 2017, the Government published its ‘Future Partnership’ paper on 
collaboration on science and innovation, which purports to set out “the UK’s objectives 
for an ambitious science and innovation agreement with the EU”.3 However—as Professor 
Chris Whitty, the Government’s Interim Chief Scientific Adviser, told us—this document 
is “high on aspiration and a bit light on detail”.4 The Government has also now established 
a ‘High Level Stakeholder Working Group on EU Exit, Universities, Research and 
Innovation’, with an emphasis on “considering all factors related to research and innovation 
that need to be taken into account as Government policy develops”.5 Meanwhile, ‘Phase 
2’ of the Brexit negotiations commenced in March 2018, and action must now be taken 
to address the concerns and opportunities outlined in our predecessor’s report, with an 
adequate level of detail provided on the Government’s intentions in this area.
1 Science and Technology Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2016–17, Leaving the EU: implications and 
opportunities for science and research, HC 502
2 Science and Technology Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2016–17, Leaving the EU: implications and 
opportunities for science and research, HC 502, para 27
3 HM Government, Collaboration on science and innovation: future partnership paper (6 September 2017), para 3
4 Oral evidence taken on 17 October 2017, HC (2017–19) 437, Q11
5 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Terms of reference and membership: high level 
stakeholder working group on EU exit, universities, research and innovation’, accessed 9 March 2018
 Brexit, science and innovation 6
3. UK science is entering the Brexit process from a strong starting position. As the 
Government’s Future Partnership paper notes, the UK is home to four of the world’s top 
ten universities, and has more Nobel Laureates than any country outside the United States.6 
We were told that the UK is second only to Germany in EU project participation,7 and 
reminded that the Government’s £4.7bn increase to the UK’s research and development 
budget by 2020/21 represents the biggest increase in public R&D investment since 1979.8 
The Government has also made a commitment to increase R&D spending as a proportion 
of GDP to 2.4% by 2027.9
Our inquiry
4. In January 2018 we called for written submissions to inform our work, and received 
over 80 responses. This material was used to inform a summit we held on Brexit, science 
and innovation at the Institution of Civil Engineers on 22 February, with over fifty 
representatives from the community.10 We invited the Minister for Universities, Science, 
Research and Innovation—Sam Gyimah MP—to address the summit. Having previously 
recommended that the Department for Exiting the European Union appoint its own Chief 
Scientific Advisor, we were pleased that the appointee to this new role (Chris Jones) was 
also able to attend to listen to the discussions. We are grateful to everyone who contributed 
to our work.
5. We held an oral evidence session with the Minister on 6 March to follow up on the 
issues explored at the summit and raised in written evidence. The Minister previewed a 
paper his department were due to publish later that day on the European Commission’s 
consultation on the structure and priorities for Framework Programme 9. This was one of 
several developments in the last few days with a bearing on science and innovation after 
Brexit. A report published by the Wellcome Trust on the day of our summit suggested that 
there was scope for a dedicated science and innovation agreement to be drawn up as part 
of the Brexit negotiations:
Some of the solutions [The Wellcome Trust] propose will need to be 
included in a formal agreement, which could be a chapter within an EU–UK 
trade deal or a stand-alone research and innovation agreement. There are 
precedents for the latter—for example, Israel is associated to Horizon-2020 
through a scientific and technological agreement with the EU, but also has 
an overarching association agreement with the EU.11
The Prime Minister’s Mansion House speech on 2 March reinforced the idea of such an 
agreement being negotiated, with reference to the Government’s desire for a “far-reaching 
science and innovation pact”.12 On 7 March the European Commission published its draft 
guidelines for the Brexit negotiations,13 and on 6 March a draft European Parliament 
motion on the Brexit deal was published in the media.14
6 HM Government, Collaboration on science and innovation: future partnership paper (6 September 2017), para 4
7 Q63 [Amanda Dickins]
8 Evidence taken on 17 October 2017, HC 438, Q30 [Jo Johnson]
9 HM Government, Collaboration on science and innovation: future partnership paper (6 September 2017), para 5
10 See Annex A for attendance list. A transcript from the summit has been published as BSI 85.
11 Wellcome Trust, Building a strong future for European Science: Brexit and beyond (February 2018), p7
12 Gov.uk, ‘PM speech on our future economic partnership with the European Union’, 2 March 2018
13 Council of the European Union, European Council (Art.50) (23 March 2018)—Draft guidelines (7 March 2018)
14 “May ‘double cherry-picking’ on Brexit, says leaked EU report”, The Guardian, 6 March 2018
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6. The need for clarity about the future shape of the UK’s post-Brexit science and 
innovation relationship with the EU has been put into a stronger focus in the light of 
these developments, and we intend to visit Brussels in the coming months to follow up 
on many of the points raised through our work. Our report focuses on what steps the 
Government needs to take now to ensure that the UK retains and builds on its leadership 
position in science and innovation in the context of leaving the EU. In particular, we are 
publishing our report in order to influence the Government’s approach to ‘Phase 2’ of the 
Brexit negotiations.
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2 Priority areas for a science and 
innovation agreement
7. Our inquiry revisited many of the Brexit priority areas for science that were explored 
by our predecessor Committee—funding, people, regulation, and collaboration. There 
are many points that require Government attention, including the UK’s relationship with 
Euratom,15 the scope for implementing the new EU Clinical Trials Regulation,16 data-
sharing,17 and standards-setting. In this Report we have selected a number of priority 
areas to highlight for particular attention in a UK-EU science and innovation agreement.
Participation in Framework Programme 9
8. Horizon 2020 (or ‘Framework programme 8’) is the EU’s flagship research funding 
programme. However, it is a time-limited programme, covering the EU’s 2014–2020 
budget cycle. The details of the successor programme—’Framework Programme 9’ (FP9), 
covering 2021–2027—is due to be negotiated soon within the EU. As the UK is currently 
still a member of the EU it is able to feed in to the EU’s current consultation on the form that 
FP9 should take, and the Government published its input to this process on 6 March.18 It 
outlined nine features for the new programme that the Government identify as important 
to the UK.19 These included a focus on ‘excellence’, and the need for FP9 to “stimulate the 
creation of markets of the future”, through “support focused on innovation and cross-
border-industry-driven collaborative research”. It also highlighted the significance of UK 
SMEs being able to participate in FP9 in order to contribute to a focus on ‘innovation’. 
This reflects the CBI’s view that the EU’s “long-term funding, collaborative opportunities 
and the ability to influence regulations are all valued by enterprises of all sizes”.20
9. We are encouraged to see the Government providing input to the EU’s consultation 
on the shape of Framework Programme 9, including the emphases it places on 
excellence and innovation. These are important features for the new programme, and 
the UK should continue to play a full part in shaping FP9 while it remains a member 
of the EU, not least to demonstrate the contribution that UK research and innovation 
can continue to make post-Brexit for the mutual benefit of the UK and EU members.
10. The Government’s Future Partnership paper noted in September 2017 that the 
terms to be agreed in relation to future participation in FP9 would include “the size of 
any financial contribution, which the UK would need to weigh against other spending 
priorities”.21 The Minister told us that there were two tests for the UK’s participation in 
FP9—a focus on ‘excellence’, and ‘value for money’.22 He told us that “we are not going 
15 Qq98–101. See also, for instance, Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, Second Report of Session 
2017–19, Leaving the EU: implications for the civil nuclear sector, HC 378, and Euratom, Commons Briefing Paper 
CBP8036.
16 See paras 27–30
17 See, for instance, Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Second Report of Session 2017–19, The potential 
impact of Brexit and the creative industries, tourism and the digital single market, HC 365, paras 105–120
18 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, UK position paper on the Ninth Framework 
Programme for Research and Innovation (6 March 2018)
19 Q6
20 CBI, Collaborate to innovate: Developing UK access to Framework Programme 9 (March 2018)
21 HM Government, Collaboration on science and innovation: future partnership paper (6 September 2017)
22 Q7
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to participate at any price […] It has to be a realistic deal that works for the UK”.23 We 
note that our predecessor Committee secured an assurance in 2017 from Jo Johnson MP, 
then Science Minister, that any future financial contribution to Framework Programme 
9 would not be at the expense of the UK Science Budget (i.e. UK participation will not 
require money to be diverted away from the UK research councils).24
11. The House of Lords Science and Technology Committee has noted previously that 
while the UK is a net contributor to the EU overall, it is a net receiver of EU funding for 
research.25 However, whether this will still be possible after Brexit may still be subject to 
negotiation: a European Parliament motion on the Brexit deal published online in March 
included a clause stating that the European Parliament could consider UK participation 
in the EU Research and Innovation Framework Programme “as a third country”, “without 
permitting net transfer from the EU budget to the UK”.26 This suggests that the EU might 
not be content for the UK to be an overall beneficiary from FP9 after Brexit. This would not 
be unusual; the Wellcome Trust’s report quotes the Norwegian Research Council saying 
that “[this] is without any doubt our country’s most important international partnership 
within research and innovation”.27
12. The European Scrutiny Committee noted earlier this month that discussion of future 
participation in FP9 will take place “in parallel to discussions on many other politically 
sensitive aspects of the post-Brexit EU-UK relationship”, and that participation in FP9 
“should therefore not be taken as a given”. It called for the Government to confirm that it 
would “seek for the UK to become ‘associated’ (or the equivalent term under the future 
legal framework after 2020) with the next Framework Programme, or, if not, which other 
‘options for participating’ the Government is exploring”.28 Calls for the UK to achieve 
associated status in relation to FP9 have also been made recently by the CBI,29 the 
Wellcome Trust,30 and several others in written evidence to us.31
13. The recently published European Commission draft negotiating guidelines restate 
that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”.32 The draft guidelines also refer to the 
UK participating in research and innovation, subject to “the relevant conditions for the 
participation of third countries to be established in the corresponding programmes in the 
next Multiannual Financial Framework” (emphasis added).33
23 Transcript of the Science and Technology Committee Summit on 22 February 2018 (BSI 85) p52
24 Oral evidence taken on 17 October 2017, HC (2017–19) 438, Q34
25 House of Lords, EU membership and UK science, Second Report of the Science and Technology Committee, 
Session 2015–16, HL Paper 127, para 105
26 Motion for a resolution to wind up the debate on the framework of the future EU-UK relationship (5 March 
2018), para 35
27 Wellcome Trust, Building a strong future for European Science: Brexit and beyond (February 2018), p8
28 European Scrutiny Committee, EU Research Funding: Interim evaluation of Horizon 2020 (39425), 5271/18, 
COM(18) 2, para 10.12
29 CBI, Collaborate to innovate: Developing UK access to Framework Programme 9 (March 2018), p1
30 Wellcome Trust, Building a strong future for European Science: Brexit and beyond (February 2018), p1
31 See, for instance, Universities UK (BSI 19), University of Bristol (BSI 50) para 3.3ii, ELIXIR and ELIXIR UK (BSI 52), 
National Physical Laboratory (BSI 57), Samsung UK and Ireland (BSI 64) para 2.8, Johnson Matthey (BSI 79).
32 European Council, Article 50 (23 March 2018) Draft guidelines (7 March 2018), para 1
33 European Council, Article 50 (23 March 2018) Draft guidelines (7 March 2018), para 8
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14. The Minister emphasised that the Government’s input to the FP9 consultation was 
“not a commitment to associate with FP9”, but was “a positive vision of what would make 
the UK excited about FP9”.34 Amanda Dickins, a Deputy Director in the Department of 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, added that “At this point, it would be unwise to 
commit oneself to a programme that is yet to be finalised”.35
15. We are concerned that the Government’s default position does not appear to 
be that the UK will participate in Framework Programme 9. While the details of 
the Programme have not yet been agreed, the Government should state clearly that it 
intends to participate unless there is a material unfavourable difference between the 
new Programme and its predecessor, and that the UK is ready to pay a fair ‘entry fee’ 
to secure this. If the price is too high, or the focus on excellence is diluted, a change in 
approach might be warranted, but the Government’s explicitly stated assumption must 
be to participate fully. Specifically, the Government should state clearly in its response 
to this Report that it intends to secure Associated Country status for Framework 
Programme 9.
People
16. The Government’s future partnership paper states that:
The UK and the EU must ensure that their research communities can 
continue to access the high-level skills that support innovation in science 
and technology. The Government has made clear that, although freedom of 
movement will cease to apply in the UK, the UK will continue to welcome 
the brightest and best, and as such, migration between the UK and the EU 
will continue after the UK leaves the EU. This Government wants the UK 
to remain a hub for international talent and its departure from the EU must 
be seen in this context.36
17. The importance of ‘people’ to UK science was further underlined by several 
participants at our summit. Niall Dickson, representing the Brexit Health Alliance, 
emphasised that there was a need to ensure that scientists continue to see the UK as an 
attractive place to work:
We have always gone on the principle of immigration of “How do we keep 
people out of this country?” We need to turn that, in a sense, on its head 
here. Trying to develop a system that is based on access on one or other 
characteristics only—be it the skill level, the pay or the region that these 
people come from—we have to develop a much more flexible system that is 
based on the needs of this country, and the needs of this country in terms 
of science and technology have not been sufficiently recognised.
Similarly, Sir Venki Ramakrishnan, the President of the Royal Society, outlined why 
mobility was important for international competitiveness:
You may ask, “Why is mobility important at all? Why simply couldn’t we 
grow our own talent and why do we need immigrants?” The reason is that 
34 Q6
35 Q9
36 HM Government, Collaboration on science and innovation: future partnership paper (6 September 2017)
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when you have mobility you have a much more rapid exchange of ideas and 
expertise. That allows you to remain at the cutting edge of, essentially, any 
science or technology. You cannot in isolation hope to be the leader for ever. 
You may be the leader temporarily, but then other people will have different 
ideas. If you do not know them, you are not in good communication and 
you do not have shared expertise; you have a problem. That is the reason 
why we must encourage mobility.
Regardless of how much talent we grow here, we will always need talent 
from abroad, because if you want to be the best in the world you have to 
recruit from the best. Sports teams know this. It is the same with science.37
Immigration policy and visas
18. Naturally, the UK’s approach to the question of ‘people’ is embodied in its post-Brexit 
immigration plans, and the details of various schemes. Our attention was drawn to several 
examples of where current policy is not serving science well.
19. In November 2017 the Government announced an additional 1,000 Tier 1 (Exceptional 
Talent) visas.38 While this was a helpful measure for ensuring “the brightest and best” 
can work in the UK, many of the written submissions we received argued that it is not 
only the ‘exceptional’ researchers who the UK must work to retain, but the technicians, 
laboratory assistants and others who occupy lower profile but no less essential roles in the 
UK’s science and innovation sectors. 39 Such people would fall under ‘Tier 2’ (general) of 
the visa system, rather than benefit from the additional Tier 1 allocation. However, the 
Home Affairs Committee’s report ‘Home Office delivery of Brexit: immigration’ noted 
that in January 2018 the cap on Tier 2 visas was reached for the second successive month, 
causing minimum salary requirements for a visa to jump from £30,000 to over £50,000 a 
year.40 This would be above the salary of most, if not all, the technicians working in the 
UK. Forty science and innovation organisations wrote to the Prime Minister earlier this 
month to highlight the harm being caused by the cap. They pointed out that two-thirds of 
roles in the ‘shortage occupation’ list were in science, technology and medicine, and called 
for such posts to be exempt from the restrictions.41
20. There is also an issue about uncertainty surrounding the likely status of some EU 
researchers if they have not been able to demonstrate a sufficient employment record, 
perhaps if they have not always been employed because they have been students. 
The Government has said that EU nationals will be able to apply for ‘settled status’ if 
they have been resident in the UK for five years. The Home Affairs Committee noted 
in February 2018, however, a lack of clarity for those EU citizens who have completed 
five years of continuous residence in the UK but who are temporarily living outside the 
country. A particular issue is that to apply for permanent residency requires evidence of 
37 Transcript of the Science and Technology Committee Summit on 22 February 2018 (BSI 85) p24
38 Gov.uk, ‘Government doubles exceptional talent visa’, 15 November 2017
39 See, for instance, Royal Society (BSI 73) para 5
40 Home Affairs Committee, Third Report of Session 2017–19, Home Office delivery of Brexit: immigration, HC 421, 
para 49
41 Campaign for Science and Engineering, ‘CaSE calls on Prime Minister to revise current visa restrictions’, 8 March 
2018
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‘comprehensive sickness insurance’ (CSI) for people who have not been in employment.42 
The Science Minister explained that although EU directives require students to have CSI 
to qualify for permanent residence, the Government would “not require students living 
here to prove that they have held such insurance when they apply for settled status”.43 The 
Home Office, the Minister told us, is developing a ‘Settlement Scheme’ to be launched “in 
the autumn”.44
21. We heard that scientists were being disadvantaged by visa rules which did not 
recognise the legitimate need for researchers to spend time in other countries for field 
visits as part of their work. Naomi Weir, from the Campaign for Science and Engineering, 
explained that “rules currently preventing researchers wishing to obtain indefinite leave 
to remain from spending more than 180 days [outside the UK] in any 12-month period 
in the course of their work fail to recognise the nature of work in our sector. […] This 
situation could easily be resolved by amending indefinite leave to remain rules to permit 
research activity overseas as part of their rules”.45
22. The Science Minister told us that he envisaged that the science and innovation ‘pact’ 
that the Prime Minister referred to in her recent Mansion House speech would address 
issues of immigration policy. He was “very aware” that “it is not just about the framework 
programmes, but about people. In fact, getting the right people—the brightest and best 
minds—here is as critical as participating in programmes if we are to succeed in science 
and innovation”.46 However, he told us that that the Migration Advisory Committee 
(MAC) was “looking at the evidence on international students, academics coming here”,47 
and that BEIS had asked the MAC to report on how the UK’s immigration system should 
be aligned with the Government’s Industrial Strategy.48 He confirmed that that the MAC 
was due to report on these points by September 2018.49
23. For the UK to achieve the Government’s stated goal of continuing to welcome 
the brightest and the best, it is imperative that the migration system for scientists, 
researchers and scientific technicians recognises the need for mobility, including 
the benefits for scientists moving between research organisations and taking part in 
collaborative visits A EU-UK science and innovation ‘pact’ must encompass issues 
relating to ‘people’. A pact that does not address this fully would be pointless. The 
Migration Advisory Committee is due to report in September 2018, but the current 
uncertainty cannot be allowed to continue for another six months. We recommend 
that the Government ask the Migration Advisory Committee to bring forward its 
conclusions in relation to the immigration arrangements needed to support science and 
innovation, and build these into a science and innovation agreement with the EU by 
October 2018 or earlier if possible. We are concerned that if a people-centred science 
and innovation pact is negotiated later it risks being less comprehensive due to other 
42 Home Affairs Committee, Third Report of Session 2017–19, Home Office delivery of Brexit: immigration, HC 421, 
paras 15, 32
43 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BSI 86)
44 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BSI 86)
45 Transcript of the Science and Technology Committee Summit on 22 February 2018 (BSI 85) p13
46 Q27
47 Q28
48 Q36
49 Q38
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negotiation priorities of the wider post-Brexit trade deal. Furthermore, if a pact is not 
agreed in late 2018 this will increase risks to retaining and attracting the essential talent 
that our science and innovation sectors need.
Regulation
24. UCL noted that the Government’s Future Partnership Paper “gives little detail 
on regulation”, and urged the Government to “consider the opportunities for the UK 
to become a global leader in scientific regulation, particularly in areas such as animal 
research, biomedical sciences, clinical trials, data protection, and research ethics, using 
regulation to advance public dialogue and engagement on complex issues around science 
and regulation, and to drive scientific progress”.50
25. The Prime Minister’s Florence speech in September set out what has since been 
referred to as the ‘three baskets’ metaphor for assessing where UK regulation should 
diverge from the EU and where it should be aligned:
In any trading relationship, both sides have to agree on a set of rules which 
govern how each side behaves. So we will need to discuss with our European 
partners new ways of managing our interdependence and our differences, 
in the context of our shared values.
There will be areas of policy and regulation which are outside the scope of 
our trade and economic relations where this should be straightforward.
There will be areas which do affect our economic relations where we and 
our European friends may have different goals; or where we share the same 
goals but want to achieve them through different means.
And there will be areas where we want to achieve the same goals in the 
same ways, because it makes sense for our economies.51
26. Given the breadth of regulations that are relevant to the science and innovation 
community it was no surprise to us that there were a range of views expressed in evidence 
on the merits of alignment or divergence in different cases. For instance, the CBI 
emphasised that “shared regulatory frameworks are the grease that keeps good trading 
relationships moving”,52 and the Wellcome Sanger Institute argued that “divorcing the 
UK from EU legislation risks poorer EU legislation and leaves the UK outside the system, 
or forced to accommodate weak regulation”.53 The Institute suggested that:
It is important to recognise there is a difference between gold-plating 
regulation and diverging from it. Many of the suggestions around 
divergence come coupled with complaints about the cumbersome nature 
of EU regulation, with the implication of deregulating. Deregulation and 
divergence should be viewed with great caution.54
50 UCL (BSI 60) para 12
51 Gov.uk, ‘PM’s Florence speech: a new era of cooperation and partnership between the UK and the EU’, 22 
September 2017
52 CBI (BSI 42)
53 Wellcome Sanger Institute (BSI 5) para 9
54 Wellcome Sanger Institute (BSI 5) para 10
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On the other hand, the Agricultural Biotechnology Council had concerns about the 
‘close regulatory alignment’ sought in the Government’s position paper in the context of 
agricultural biotech, since the EU regulatory regime “has not been based on science and 
has proved to be a barrier to innovation”.55
27. Reflecting these differences, the Royal Society told us that there was a need for careful 
case-by-case assessment of regulations in the context of science:
In the long-term, it is critical that we identify areas of regulation where 
continued alignment with EU rules is most important for the UK to 
collaborate and trade, while also recognising the opportunities to develop 
new regulatory approaches. In the short term, mechanisms should be put in 
place to ensure that the impact of any Regulations made as the UK departs 
from the EU are thoroughly scrutinised, supported by a transparent and 
thorough assessment of the possible effects on research.56
28. A particular example of where clarity over future regulation in the UK highlighted 
during our inquiry relates to clinical trials. Our predecessor Committee’s report on EU 
regulation of the life sciences noted that a new Clinical Trials Regulation57 had been 
developed by the EU, to replace an existing Clinical Trials Directive dating from 2001. 
The existing Directive had been highly criticised by the community, as it had led to 
“increased burden on academic researchers and a drop in clinical trials conducted in the 
UK and the EU”.58 The new Regulation, however, has attracted much more support from 
the community, and the UK has contributed to its development.59 We were told that it 
was important that the UK aligned with the Regulation once its provisions apply, and 
worked to secure access to the relevant EU infrastructure that would allow participation 
in clinical trials to continue, such as the central portal and database being created as part 
of the new Regulation.60
29. In September 2017 we asked DExEU to clarify the UK’s position in relation to the 
new Clinical Trials Regulation, since the new Regulation is not expected to be in force 
until after Brexit. Robin Walker MP explained then that this means that future alignment 
will be “subject to negotiations”:
The general approach taken in the Repeal Bill (formally known as the 
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill) is that EU law which applies directly in 
the UK legal system immediately before exit will be converted into domestic 
law after exit. […]
Under the Bill, direct EU legislation is only converted and incorporated 
into domestic law “so far as operative immediately before exit day”. […] We 
are aware that the implementation of the EU Clinical Trials Regulation has 
been postponed […] the new Regulation may take effect after we leave the 
55 Agricultural Biotechnology Council (BSI 15)
56 Royal Society (BSI 73) para 29
57 Council Regulation (EC) No.536/2014
58 Science and Technology Committee, First Report of Session 2016–17, EU regulation of the life sciences, HC 158, 
para 23
59 House of Lords, EU membership and UK science, Second Report of the Science and Technology Committee, 
Session 2015–16, HL Paper 127, para 24
60 Association of Medical Research Charities (BIS 32). See also Regulating clinical trials, POSTnote 561, 
Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 2 October 2017
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EU and therefore will not be covered by the Repeal Bill and so our future 
alignment with the new EU Clinical Trials Regulation will be subject to 
negotiations.
However, as the Secretaries of State for Health and for Business, Energy 
and Industrial Strategy jointly set out in an open letter in the Financial 
Times on 5 July, the UK is fully committed to continuing the close working 
relationship we enjoy with our European partners across the field of 
medicines regulation that will include any future EU regime on clinical 
trials.61
30. The Academy of Medical Sciences told us that “Harmonisation to this regulation 
should be prioritised by the UK Government and urgent clarity is required on how the 
UK will implement the regulation during the transition period”.62 However, the Science 
Minister’s response was simply that “the current regulatory approval legislation [i.e. 
reflecting the existing Clinical Trials Directive, which will be transposed into UK law] will 
stay in place until such time as any changes are needed so there will be no interruption in 
UK clinical trials approval”.63 This may well be the case in the period immediately after 
Brexit and before the Regulation applies in the EU, but his statement does not provide any 
further clarity on what position the UK will take after that point, or reflect the need to 
negotiate access to the infrastructure necessary to continue to participate in clinical trials 
from then on.
31. The Science Minister’s response to us on clinical trials regulation is unsatisfactory. 
His position that “the current regulatory approval legislation will stay in place until 
such time as any changes are needed” ignores the fact that work is needed now to ensure 
that the UK can participate in and lead clinical trials in the future. We recommend 
that the Government revisit this statement in its response to our report.
Regulatory bodies
32. The Prime Minister’s Mansion House speech in March suggested that the Government 
was exploring associate membership of regulatory bodies such as the European Medicines 
Agency:
We will also want to explore with the EU, the terms on which the UK could 
remain part of EU agencies such as those that are critical for the chemicals, 
medicines and aerospace industries: the European Medicines Agency, the 
European Chemicals Agency, and the European Aviation Safety Agency.
We would, of course, accept that this would mean abiding by the rules of 
those agencies and making an appropriate financial contribution. I want 
to explain what I believe the benefits of this approach could be, both for us 
and the EU.
First, associate membership of these agencies is the only way to meet our 
objective of ensuring that these products only need to undergo one series of 
approvals, in one country.
61 Correspondence from Robin Walker MP dated 21 September 2017
62 Academy of Medical Sciences (BSI 43)
63 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BSI 86)
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Second, these agencies have a critical role in setting and enforcing relevant 
rules. And if we were able to negotiate associate membership we would be 
able to ensure that we could continue to provide our technical expertise.
Third, associate membership could permit UK firms to resolve certain 
challenges related to the agencies through UK courts rather than the ECJ.64
On the European Medicines Agency, the Prime Minister said that membership would 
mean:
investment in new innovative medicines continuing in the UK, and it would 
mean these medicines getting to patients faster as firms prioritise larger 
markets when they start the lengthy process of seeking authorisations. But 
it would also be good for the EU because the UK regulator assesses more 
new medicines than any other member state. And the EU would continue 
to access the expertise of the UK’s world-leading universities.65
33. It remains to be seen whether the ambition of ‘association’ will be realised through the 
negotiations. In the draft negotiating guidelines published by the Council of the European 
Union on 7 March, the Council stated that “the Union will preserve its autonomy as 
regards its decision-making, which excludes participation of the United Kingdom as a 
third-country to EU Institutions, agencies or bodies” (emphasis added).66 This suggests 
that there may still be some doubt that a formal ‘Associate Member’ status will be possible 
in this context, with the assumption that the UK will be a ‘Third Country’ instead.
64 Gov.uk, ‘PM speech on our future economic partnership with the European Union’, 2 March 2018
65 Gov.uk, ‘PM speech on our future economic partnership with the European Union’, 2 March 2018
66 Council of the European Union, European Council (Art.50) (23 March 2018)—Draft guidelines (7 March 2018)
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3 The urgent need for action
34. A recurring theme arising from our summit and the written evidence we received was 
the need for urgency in tackling many of the issues raised in this report (and others not 
set out in detail here). In practice, there was a significant overlap in the themes identified 
by our predecessor Committee and those highlighted to us in written evidence and at our 
summit, but with an added emphasis on the need for timely action. For instance, Andrew 
Mackenzie, representing the Physiological Society warned us that:
A lot of the time the rhetoric from some of the politicians is around, “This 
is a problem that we will deal with when the final solution is arrived at post-
Brexit and it will all be fine”. The reality is that the uncertainty is causing 
problems right now today, and our members tell us that people are not 
taking up job offers now.67
Naomi Weir, representing the Campaign for Science and Engineering, made a similar plea 
for timely action on immigration and visa policies:
On timings, this is urgent. Messaging and domestic [immigration/visa] 
policies must be and can be unilaterally changed. These must happen soon 
because the messages are being watched by an international audience and 
we cannot afford to continue in the way we have been so far.68
35. Professor Michael Arthur, representing the Russell Group EU Working Group, 
provided a striking insight into the effects of uncertainty over future immigration policy 
that UCL had begun to see, providing further evidence of the need for urgency:
We advertise a series of excellence fellowships, mainly in biomedical 
sciences. Each year we usually have over 100 applicants. On average, we 
would expect 30% or so of those applicants to be from other European 
institutions. This year we dropped from 30% to zero applications, something 
that quite shocked me.69
Similarly, the Association for Innovation, Research and Technology Organisations 
(AIRTO) told us that there were already measurable effects on recruitment of EU citizens:
AIRTO members are seeing their permanent EU employees resigning and 
returning to their home country or to other EU countries. This is occurring 
at a slightly higher level than observed prior to the referendum vote in 2016, 
but it is compounded by a significant drop in applications from non-UK EU 
nationals for permanent employment vacancies, which as a consequence 
are becoming harder to fill.70
36. On the issue of urgency in relation to funding, the University of Bristol told us that 
“uncertainty around FP9 participation continues, and therefore a push for an agreement 
which includes provision for full access to FP9 as an Associated Country should be 
prioritised in the next phases of the negotiations”.71
67 Transcript of the Science and Technology Committee Summit on 22 February 2018 (BSI 85) p27
68 Transcript of the Science and Technology Committee Summit on 22 February 2018 (BSI 85) p14
69 Transcript of the Science and Technology Committee Summit on 22 February 2018 (BSI 85) p26
70 AIRTO (BSI 45) p2
71 University of Bristol (BSI 50) para 3.3
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37. Professor Alistair Buchan, representing the University of Oxford at our summit, 
believed that science should have the same profile as the issue of the Northern Ireland 
border in terms of its significance to the Brexit discussions:
We need a strategy and one with intent. We need to make sure that we 
become an Irish/Northern Ireland border problem. We need to explain 
that the infrastructure, the networking, going backwards and forwards 
across Europe, is exactly the same as how Ireland has worked since the 
Good Friday accord. We need the research collaboration in Europe to be 
crystallised as a need for Government to address in the same way that the 
border is addressed, with a tight deadline.72
38. There is a wide range of organisations that the Government will need to interact with 
in order to secure such a comprehensive science and innovation agreement, and the scale 
of the task should not be underestimated. The main agencies and regulatory bodies are 
summarised in Annex B.
39. Given the risk of an extended period of uncertainty, we asked the Science Minister 
whether the Government was acting with sufficient urgency to negotiate such a ‘pact’. He 
told us that:
Having spoken to my counterparts in the EU—a lot of EU Science 
Ministers—we all take the view that science is one area that is a win-win 
for us and them. If it were left to me alone, as the Science Minister, this 
would be one area on which we could come to an agreement very early in 
the process, but it is part of a much bigger negotiation […] notwithstanding 
that, there is a sense of urgency on the part of the Government.73
Nevertheless, he added that:
The timescale will be driven by cross-Government decisions, rather than 
what I specifically want […] It is not how quickly we can land a deal and 
also not just a unilateral decision. The Commission also has to want to do a 
deal in the terms that we want.74
40. Producing an early agreement on science and innovation would set a positive tone 
for the rest of the Brexit negotiations, and should be a clear ‘win-win’ for both the UK 
and the EU. We welcome the Prime Minister’s commitment to agreeing “a far-reaching 
science and innovation pact”, but we are concerned that delays in agreeing this will 
undermine the UK’s current position as a science superpower. Given the significance of 
science and innovation to the UK economy, reaching an agreement on this should now 
be as important to the Government as the question of security. It must be stripped out 
from the wider trade negotiations for focused attention, rather than become a knock-
on consequence of other negotiations or traded against other aspects of a post-Brexit 
deal. We do not accept that ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’ in this context. 
We recommend that the Government make drafting and negotiating a science and 
innovation agreement an urgent priority. Our report sets out the key issues that such an 
agreement should cover.
72 Transcript of the Science and Technology Committee Summit on 22 February 2018 (BSI 85) p71
73 Qq4–5
74 Q19
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Conclusions and recommendations
1. We are encouraged to see the Government providing input to the EU’s consultation 
on the shape of Framework Programme 9, including the emphases it places on 
excellence and innovation. These are important features for the new programme, 
and the UK should continue to play a full part in shaping FP9 while it remains a 
member of the EU, not least to demonstrate the contribution that UK research and 
innovation can continue to make post-Brexit for the mutual benefit of the UK and 
EU members. (Paragraph 9)
2. We are concerned that the Government’s default position does not appear to be 
that the UK will participate in Framework Programme 9. While the details of the 
Programme have not yet been agreed, the Government should state clearly that it 
intends to participate unless there is a material unfavourable difference between the 
new Programme and its predecessor, and that the UK is ready to pay a fair ‘entry fee’ 
to secure this. If the price is too high, or the focus on excellence is diluted, a change in 
approach might be warranted, but the Government’s explicitly stated assumption must 
be to participate fully. Specifically, the Government should state clearly in its response 
to this Report that it intends to secure Associated Country status for Framework 
Programme 9. (Paragraph 15)
3. For the UK to achieve the Government’s stated goal of continuing to welcome the 
brightest and the best, it is imperative that the migration system for scientists, 
researchers and scientific technicians recognises the need for mobility, including 
the benefits for scientists moving between research organisations and taking part in 
collaborative visits A EU-UK science and innovation ‘pact’ must encompass issues 
relating to ‘people’. A pact that does not address this fully would be pointless. The 
Migration Advisory Committee is due to report in September 2018, but the current 
uncertainty cannot be allowed to continue for another six months. We recommend 
that the Government ask the Migration Advisory Committee to bring forward its 
conclusions in relation to the immigration arrangements needed to support science 
and innovation, and build these into a science and innovation agreement with the 
EU by October 2018 or earlier if possible. We are concerned that if a people-centred 
science and innovation pact is negotiated later it risks being less comprehensive due 
to other negotiation priorities of the wider post-Brexit trade deal. Furthermore, if a 
pact is not agreed in late 2018 this will increase risks to retaining and attracting the 
essential talent that our science and innovation sectors need. (Paragraph 23)
4. The Science Minister’s response to us on clinical trials regulation is unsatisfactory. 
His position that “the current regulatory approval legislation will stay in place until 
such time as any changes are needed” ignores the fact that work is needed now 
to ensure that the UK can participate in and lead clinical trials in the future. We 
recommend that the Government revisit this statement in its response to our report. 
(Paragraph 31)
5. Producing an early agreement on science and innovation would set a positive tone 
for the rest of the Brexit negotiations, and should be a clear ‘win-win’ for both the 
UK and the EU. We welcome the Prime Minister’s commitment to agreeing “a far-
reaching science and innovation pact”, but we are concerned that delays in agreeing 
this will undermine the UK’s current position as a science superpower. Given the 
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significance of science and innovation to the UK economy, reaching an agreement 
on this should now be as important to the Government as the question of security. It 
must be stripped out from the wider trade negotiations for focused attention, rather 
than become a knock-on consequence of other negotiations or traded against other 
aspects of a post-Brexit deal. We do not accept that ‘nothing is agreed until everything 
is agreed’ in this context. We recommend that the Government make drafting and 
negotiating a science and innovation agreement an urgent priority. Our report sets 
out the key issues that such an agreement should cover. (Paragraph 40)
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Annex A: List of summit participants, 
22 February 2018
Representative Organisation
Dr Gillies O’Bryan-Tear Academy of Medical Royal Colleges
Professor Anne Dell
Academy of Medical Sciences and Trustee, Biochemical 
Society
Professor Richard Brook
AIRTO (Association for Innovation, Research and 
Technology Organisations)
Professor Johan Schot
Association for Studies in Innovation Science and 
Technology
Eleanor Charsley Association of British Healthcare Industries
Dr Cat Ball Association of Medical Research Charities
Elliot Dunster Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry
Laura Collister Bio Industry Association
Niall Dickson Brexit Health Alliance
Professor Dame Helen Wallace British Academy
Dr Anna Zecharia British Pharmacological Society
Jo Revill British Society for Immunology
Naomi Weir Campaign for Science and Engineering
Chris Jones Chief Scientific Adviser, Department for Exiting the EU
Rob Davies CLOSER, the UK Longitudinal Studies Consortium
Felicity Burch Confederation of British Industry
Chris McDonald Federation of Small Businesses
Professor Gerry McKenna Heads of University Centres of Biomedical Sciences
Kevin Baughan Innovate UK
Professor Mark Tooley Institute of Physics and Engineering in Medicine
Professor Geoffrey Maitland
Institution of Chemical Engineers and the Royal 
Academy of Engineers
Professor Lord Robert Mair Institution of Civil Engineers
Christopher J Darby John Innes Centre
Professor Paul Kellam Microbiology Society
Dr Greg Walker MillionPlus, The Association for Modern Universities
Sam Gyimah MP
Minister for Universities, Science, Research and 
Innovation
Caroline Pritchard National Measurement Laboratory
Professor Russell Wynn National Oceanography Centre
Jen Rae Nesta
Sue Ferns Prospect
Dr David Rhodes Public Health England
Mr Mike Bright Research Councils UK
Dr Claire Thompson Royal Pharmaceutical Society
Mark Downs Royal Society of Biology
Dr Stephen Benn Royal Society of Biology
Jo Reynolds Royal Society of Chemistry
Professor David Cole-Hamilton Royal Society of Edinburgh
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Representative Organisation
Iain Wilton Royal Statistical Society
Professor Michael Arthur Russell Group EU Advisory Group
Sharon Todd SCI
Dr Estrella Luna Diez
Spanish Researchers in the United Kingdom (SRUK/
CERU)
Dariel Burdass The Physiological Society
Dr Robert Massey The Royal Astronomical Society
Sir Venki Ramakrishnan The Royal Society
Dr Marina Pais The Sainsbury Laboratory, Norwich Research Park
Professor Ian Chapman UK Atomic Energy Authority
Professor Ian Haines UK Deans of Science
Professor Julia Buckingham Universities UK
Professor Graeme Reid University College London
Professor Alastair Buchan University of Oxford
Ed Whiting Wellcome Trust
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Annex B: Main EU agencies related to 
science and technology
Table 1: Main EU agencies related to science and technology
Agency Role Arrangements for 
third countries
Jurisdiction 
or complaints 
mechanism
European Medicines 
Agency (EMA)
Provides market 
authorisation for 
medicines and medical 
devices
No provisions 
for third party 
participation, but 
representatives 
of international 
organisations can 
participate
CJEU
European Chemicals 
Agency (ECHA)
Provides market 
authorisation for 
chemicals and products 
containing chemicals
Third countries 
can be invited to 
participate
Board of Appeal 
and CJEU
European 
Intellectual Property 
Office (EUIPO)
Manages the EU 
trademark and 
registered Community 
design; also works 
with IP offices of the 
EU Member States and 
international partners to 
standardise registration 
for trademarks and 
designs globally
Third countries can 
be observers and co-
operate, but cannot 
become members
European Anti-
Fraud Office 
(OLAF); Board 
of Appeal 
and CJEU 
jurisdiction
Euratom Supply 
Agency (ESA)
Concludes supply 
contracts for nuclear 
materials for civil nuclear 
energy, and monitors 
medical radioisotope 
markets
No provision for 
third country 
participation
CJEU
European Research 
Council Executive 
Agency (ERCEA)
Implements European 
Research Council strategy 
and awards some 
Horizon 2020 grants
Representatives 
“should collectively 
reflect the full 
breadth of the 
research community 
across Europe”, but 
no clear ban on non-
Member states
n/a
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Agency Role Arrangements for 
third countries
Jurisdiction 
or complaints 
mechanism
Research Executive 
Agency
Manages and awards 
some Horizon 2020 
grants
No provision for 
third country 
membership
Under a 
Memorandum 
of 
Understanding 
between 
the Research 
Executive 
Agency 
and various 
Commission 
DGs: 
Commission, 
OLAF, CJEU
European Institute 
of Innovation and 
Technology (EIT)
Brings together higher 
education institutions, 
research labs and 
businesses to develop 
new products and start 
new companies
Third countries can 
participate, subject 
to agreement with 
EU in relevant areas
OLAF; Court of 
Auditors; CJEU
Innovation and 
Networks Executive 
Agency
Provides expertise 
and programme 
management to 
infrastructure, research 
and innovation 
projects in the fields of 
transport, energy and 
telecommunications
No provision for 3rd 
country membership
n/a
European 
Environment Agency 
(EEA)
Provides independent 
information on the 
environment to 
policymakers and the 
public
No provision for 3rd 
party involvement
CJEU
Office of the 
Body of European 
Regulators 
for Electronic 
Communications 
(BEREC)
Develops guidelines 
and advises national 
regulatory authorities 
and the European 
Commission on 
telecommunications 
regulations
Observer status 
granted for EEA 
states and candidate 
accession states
CJEU
Agency for the 
Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators 
(ACER)
Complements and 
coordinates work 
of national energy 
regulators at EU level, 
and works towards 
the completion of the 
Internal Energy Market
Third countries can 
participate, subject 
to agreement with 
EU in relevant areas
Board of Appeal 
and CJEU
European Global 
Navigation Satellite 
Systems Agency 
(GSA)
Oversees Galileo satellite 
services provision
Third countries can 
participate
CJEU
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Agency Role Arrangements for 
third countries
Jurisdiction 
or complaints 
mechanism
European Centre for 
Disease Prevention 
and Control (ECDC)
Gathers, analyses and 
disseminates data on 
over 50 communicable 
diseases and conditions
Third countries can 
participate, subject 
to equivalent 
regulations
CJEU
European 
Monitoring Centre 
for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction (EMCDDA)
Collects, analyses and 
disseminates evidence-
based information on 
drugs and drug addiction
EMCDDA co-
operates with 
candidate and 
potential candidate 
countries to the EU
CJEU
Innovative Medicines 
Initiative (IMI)
Brings together 
universities, the 
pharmaceutical 
industry, SMEs, patient 
organisations and 
regulators to accelerate 
development of, 
and access to, new 
treatments
Countries associated 
to Horizon 2020 
represented 
on States 
Representatives 
Group
CJEU
European Union 
Satellite Centre (EU 
SatCen)
Provides geospatial 
intelligence products 
and services, primarily 
through the analysis of 
data from Earth
observation satellites
Third countries can 
co-operate
CJEU
European Union 
Agency for Network 
and Information 
Security (ENISA)
EU cybersecurity agency 
setting standards, 
providing analysis and 
advice, and co-ordinating 
preparation exercises
Third countries can 
participate, subject 
to equivalent 
regulations
CJEU
European Food 
Safety Authority 
(EFSA)
Produces scientific advice 
on food safety, nutrition, 
and animal and plant 
health, to form the 
basis for EU policies and 
legislation
Third countries can 
participate, subject 
to equivalent 
regulations
CJEU
Community Plant 
Variety Office
Provides intellectual 
property rights for 
breeders of new plant 
varieties, and provides 
policy guidance and 
assistance in the exercise 
of these rights
Observer states can 
be invited
Board of Appeal 
and CJEU
European Joint 
Undertaking 
for ITER and the 
Development of 
Fusion Energy (F4E)
Provides Europe’s 
contribution to ITER, an 
international research 
effort for nuclear fusion
Third countries can 
participate, subject 
to co-operation 
agreement with 
Euratom
Commission, 
Court of 
Auditors 
and OLAF; 
arbitration 
tribunal; CJEU
 Brexit, science and innovation 26
Agency Role Arrangements for 
third countries
Jurisdiction 
or complaints 
mechanism
Fuel Cells and 
Hydrogen Joint 
Undertaking (FCH 
JU)
Public-private 
partnership between 
European Commission 
and industry to 
accelerate introduction 
of fuel cell and hydrogen 
technologies
Partnership is 
between European 
Commission and 
research and 
industry bodies
CJEU
Clean Sky Joint 
Undertaking
Public-private 
partnership between 
European Commission 
and industry to reduce 
environmental impact of 
aviation
Membership open 
only to legal entities 
established in the 
EU or countries 
associated to 
Horizon 2020
CJEU
Sources: Agency websites; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, EU agencies working for you (2015); EU 
agencies and post-Brexit options, Briefing Paper 7597, House of Commons Library, 2017. CJEU = Court of Justice of the 
European Union, OLAF = European Anti-Fraud Office
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Formal minutes
Monday 19 March 2018
Members present:
Norman Lamb, in the Chair
Vicky Ford
Darren Jones
Carol Monaghan
Damien Moore
Neil O’Brien
Martin Whitfield
Draft Report (Brexit, science and innovation), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraphs 1 to 40 read and agreed to.
Annexes agreed to.
Summary agreed to.
Resolved, That the Report be the Second Report of the Committee to the House.
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the 
provisions of Standing Order No. 134.
[Adjourned till Tuesday 20 March at 9.00 am
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Witnesses
The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications 
page of the Committee’s website.
Tuesday 6 March 2018
Sam Gyimah MP, Minister for Universities, Science, Research and 
Innovation, and Amanda Dickins, Deputy Director, EU Exit: Science and 
Innovation, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Q1–102
Published written evidence
The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications 
page of the Committee’s website.
BIS numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.
1 ABPI & BIA (BSI0075)
2 Academy of Medical Royal Colleges (BSI0035)
3 Academy of Medical Sciences (BSI0043)
4 Academy of Social Sciences (BSI0048)
5 ADS Group (BSI0006)
6 Agricultural Biotechnology Council (BSI0015)
7 AIRTO, Association of Innovation, Research & Technology Organisations (BSI0045)
8 Alzheimer’s Research UK (BSI0038)
9 AsSIST-UK (BSI0017)
10 Association of British Healthcare Industries (BSI0058)
11 Association of Medical Research Charities (BSI0032)
12 Brexit Health Alliance (BSI0030)
13 British Academy (BSI0069)
14 British Geological Survey (BSI0027)
15 British Heart Foundation (BSI0013)
16 British Pharmacological Society (BSI0007)
17 British Society for Immunology (BSI0059)
18 Campaign for Science and Engineering (BSI0076)
19 Cancer Research UK (BSI0023)
20 CBI (BSI0042)
21 Centre for Process Innovation (CPI) (BSI0065)
22 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BSI0086)
23 Dr Celia Medupin, University of Manchester and Dr Erinma Ochu, University of 
Salford (BSI0063)
24 Duchenne UK (BSI0033)
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25 ELIXIR and ELIXIR UK (BSI0052)
26 EMBL-European Bioinformatics Institute (BSI0061)
27 Federation of Small Businesses (BSI0081)
28 Fresh Produce Consortium (BSI0051)
29 GARNet (BSI0066)
30 Genetic Alliance UK (BSI0049)
31 Imperial College London (BSI0068)
32 Institute of Food Science & Technology (BSI0078)
33 Institute of Physics (BSI0082)
34 Institute of Physics and Engineering in Medicine (BSI0021)
35 Institution of Environmental Sciences (BSI0044)
36 James Hutton Institute (BSI0084)
37 John Innes Centre (BSI0020)
38 Johnson Matthey PLC (BSI0079)
39 Lancaster University (BSI0074)
40 LGC (National Measurement Laboratory) (BSI0003)
41 Lilly UK (BSI0041)
42 Martin Yuille, The University of Manchester (BSI0029)
43 Microbiology Society (BSI0039)
44 Microbiology Society (BSI0087)
45 Miss Tessa Burrington (BSI0026)
46 MSD (BSI0055)
47 National Heritage Science Forum (BSI0072)
48 National Physical Laboratory (BSI0057)
49 Nesta (BSI0067)
50 Newcastle University (BSI0034)
51 NIAB (BSI0014)
52 Odgers Berndtson (BSI0011)
53 Professor John Hardy, UCL (BSI0002)
54 Prospect (BSI0018)
55 Roche Products Limited (BSI0024)
56 Royal Academy of Engineering (BSI0056)
57 Royal Astronomical Society (BSI0053)
58 Royal Pharmaceutical Society (BSI0010)
59 Royal Society of Biology (BSI0080)
60 Royal Society of Chemistry (BSI0062)
61 Russell Group (BSI0077)
62 Samsung UK and Ireland (BSI0064)
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63 SCI (BSI0083)
64 Scottish Universities Life Sciences Alliance (BSI0008)
65 Sir Paul Nurse (BSI0009)
66 Society for Applied Microbiology (BSI0037)
67 Spanish Researchers in the UK (SRUK) (BSI0028)
68 Syngenta (BSI0012)
69 The Geological Society (BSI0036)
70 The National Oceanography Centre (BSI0025)
71 The Physiological Society (BSI0016)
72 The Royal Society (BSI0073)
73 The Royal Society of Edinburgh (BSI0031)
74 The University of Edinburgh (BSI0004)
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